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examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in 
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1. Introduction 
Team decision-making has attracted more and more interest among economists in 
recent years. Although the standard models of economic theory largely neglect the type of the 
decision maker by simply assuming individual decision-making, many economic decisions 
are made by teams, such as families, company boards, management teams, committees, or 
central bank boards. One of the key requirements of team decision-making is the need to 
aggregate individual preferences into one single team decision. 
In this paper we will examine the aggregation of social preferences in an experimental 
team dictator game. This simple game isolates pure distributional concerns from any strategic 
considerations that shape bargaining behavior, for instance, in the well-known ultimatum 
game (Güth et al., 1982).1 Hence, using the dictator game allows us to investigate how 
individual preferences with respect to the allocation of money between a dictator and a 
(powerless) recipient are transformed into a team decision. 
In general, the experimental literature on unitary team2 behavior in simple bargaining 
games is rather coherent in its finding that team decisions are typically closer to standard 
game theoretic predictions than individual decisions, that teams seem to be stronger motivated 
by payoff maximization and that their decisions are more selfish. For example, teams have 
been found to send and accept smaller transfers in the ultimatum game (Bornstein and Yaniv, 
1998), send or return smaller amounts in the trust game (Cox, 2002; Kugler et al., 2006), 
                                                 
1 Forsythe et al. (1994) used the dictator game in order to study which share of the transfers observed in the 
ultimatum game can be explained by pure altruistic motivation. By removing the responder’s option to 
reject the proposer’s offer, any strategic reason for generous offers in the dictator game is eliminated, thus 
leaving only social preferences, such as altruism, warm glow or inequality aversion, as possible 
explanations. 
2 With „unitary“ teams we denote teams that face no internal conflict in terms of payoff and that have to come up 
with a single team decision. All related studies share this feature of decision-making within teams. 
1 
choose lower efforts as second movers in a gift-exchange game (Kocher and Sutter, 2006; 
Brosig et al., 2006), play more strategically and more often according to theoretic predictions 
in signaling games (Cooper and Kagel, 2005), exit the centipede game at earlier stages 
(Bornstein et al., 2004), make more rational decisions in intellective tasks, such as the Wason 
selection task (Maciejovsky and Budescu, 2005), and gain a higher payoff/risk ratio in 
investment games (Rockenbach et al., 2006). In auctions teams display much more 
competitive bidding behavior, leading to higher rates of overbidding (Cox and Hayne, 2006; 
Sutter et al., 2005). 
In contrast to this large body of evidence Cason and Mui (1997) find teams to be more 
altruistic and other-regarding than individuals. In their experimental dictator game each 
subject has to make two decisions on the allocation of five dollars, once individually and once 
in a two-person team. Cason and Mui (1997) show that team decisions are driven by the more 
altruistic team member. They conclude that “this makes team choices more other-regarding 
than individual choices for these teams, although the difference is modest” (p. 1480). More 
precisely, individuals transfer on average 26.09% of their endowment to the receiver, 
compared to the 27.61% of teams. Cason and Mui (1997) explain this effect by recurring to 
“Social Comparison Theory” (SCT). SCT states that subjects have a tendency to appear and 
present themselves in teams in a way that is deemed socially desirable. After having observed 
other subjects’ behavior or choices or after having discussed the possible options in a game, 
the own behavior is modified to appear more in line with the perceived social norms. If other-
regarding behavior is socially desirable, then team decisions can be expected to be more 
other-regarding than individual decisions.3
                                                 
3 Cason and Mui (1997) reject “Persuasive Argument Theory” (PAT) as a possible explanation for their data. 
The bottom-line of PAT is that group discussion is able to shift choices in favor of the pre-discussion or 
initial tendency by a higher attentiveness towards more persuasive arguments in favor of one’s initial 
position. Both theories, SCT and PAT, have their roots in the psychological discussion of “group 
2 
Though (or perhaps because) the results of Cason and Mui (1997) do not fit the overall 
picture emerging from team decision experiments, they have been frequently cited and are 
widely accepted as a notable exception in the evidence on team decision-making (see, for 
example, Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Bornstein et al., 2004; 
Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Kocher and Sutter, 2005; Dufwenberg and Muren, 2006). Given the 
prominence that the results of Cason and Mui (1997) have achieved and since we consider 
replications of results important in experimental economics, this paper examines the 
robustness of Cason and Mui’s (1997) findings. Moreover, it adds some interesting new 
insights on the decision-making process within teams. 
We are not aware of any attempt to replicate the findings of Cason and Mui (1997).4 
The most closely related paper – as far as team decision-making in the dictator game is 
concerned – is by Dufwenberg and Muren (2006). They study the influence of a team’s 
gender composition on decisions in the following dictator game. A team of three subjects has 
to allocate 1000 Swedish kronor (110$ at that time) among the three team members and a 
fourth person. Teams send on average 21.83% of the pie to the fourth person, keeping 26.06% 
for each team member5. Out of the four possible gender compositions of a three-person team, 
Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) find female dominated teams to allocate significantly higher 
amounts to the fourth person, with teams of two women and one man sending the highest 
amounts. Though their study examines team behavior in the dictator game, it does not provide 
a comparison of team and individual behavior, which is the focus of our paper. 
                                                                                                                                                        
polarization” (see e.g., Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Davis, 1992; Kerr et al., 1996; Levine and 
Moreland, 1998). 
4 Note, of course, that second movers in a trust game are basically in the situation of a dictator, as they can 
determine the final distribution of money between the first and the second mover. The evidence from Cox 
(2002) clearly indicates that teams are more selfish as second movers than individuals. 
5 As dictators had a small, but positive chance (of about 1.7%) of ending up in the role of a receiver, offers above 
250 are rather due to strategic concerns than pure mistakes or altruism. 
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The paper is organized in the following way: We describe our experimental design and 
procedure in section 2. Section 3 presents the experimental results. Section 4 discusses our 
findings and concludes. 
 
2. Experimental design and procedure 
The dictator game was first introduced by Kahnemann et al. (1986) in an empirical 
study on fairness in the market place. In this game a dictator decides on the distribution of a 
given stake between himself and a second party, the receiver. The second party has no other 
option than to take whatever the dictator allocates to her. 
In our experiment participants were randomly assigned to the role of either dictator or 
receiver6. These roles were fixed throughout the experiment. Subjects in the role of dictator 
received 5€ as their endowment in each of the following three stages. 
• Stage S1: Each subject in the role of dictator decides individually on the 
transfer T to an individual receiver, where T ∈ {0.0, 0.1, 0.2, …, 4.9, 5.0}. 
• Stage S2: Each subject in the role of dictator is a member of a team with three 
persons. Each team has to make a single decision on the transfer T to a receiver 
team that also consists of three subjects. The per-capita-incentives are kept 
identical in all stages, such that in stage S2 each team member in the role of 
dictator earns 5-T€, and each team member in the role of receiver earns T€. 
• Stage S3: Each subject in the role of dictator has to make a second individual 
decision with the same rules as in stage S1. 
Note that participants were only informed about the next stage after all decisions in a 
respective stage had been taken. Hence, the first individual decision cannot have been 
                                                 
6 Since we could expect receivers to earn only little money, they were invited to participate in an individual 
decision-making experiment after the dictator experiment had been finished. 
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influenced by the subsequent team decision or the second individual decision. Furthermore, 
we used a publicly announced perfect stranger design throughout the three stages, meaning 
that no dictator was ever paired with a particular receiver more than once. 
An important feature of our design is the assignment of individuals into teams. First of 
all, we have opted for teams of three subjects each in order to catch Cason and Mui’s (1997) 
suggested extension of checking whether their empirical findings generalize when the size of 
teams gets larger (p. 1480). Second, we have used the individual stage S1-choices as an 
instrument to set up heterogeneous groups in a systematic way. Based on their stage S1-
decision we have classified subjects into terciles. Those in the lowest tercile are the “most 
selfish” subjects, those in the highest tercile the “most other-regarding”, and those in the 
middle the “moderate” subjects. Within each tercile, subjects are ranked in ascending order 
according to their individual transfer in stage S1. Each team then consists of the three 
members with the same rank in each of the three terciles. This procedure guarantees that all 
teams are very similar with respect to the within-team heterogeneity concerning individual 
transfers from stage S1. It will allow us to straightforwardly track down the influence of the 
most selfish, the moderate, or the most other-regarding member on the final team decision. 
In order to gain further insights into the process of aggregating individual preferences 
and into the structure of team discussions, the communication within each team was possible 
exclusively via an electronic chat program with protocols being stored for later analysis7. 
Subjects were requested to agree on a joint (unanimous) decision within ten minutes. As soon 
as a team had reached an agreement, each member had to type in this decision on his own 
screen. Note that we did not specify how teams had to arrive at a joint decision. Even though 
the inputs of all three members had to be identical to be valid – otherwise the team would not 
                                                 
7 The content of messages within a team was not restricted, except for forbidding abusive language and revealing 
one’s identity (through seat number, name, gender, age, courses taken, etc.). See the experimental 
instructions in the appendix for details. 
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have been paid for this stage (what never happened, actually8) – some teams argued in the 
chat that a simple majority in case of no unanimous agreement would be sufficient and the 
third member would have to abide by the majority in such a case. Of course, there was no 
possibility to enforce such a within-team agreement. 
At the end of the experiment we gathered data on subjects’ gender, allowing us to 
examine the influence of gender and gender composition on individual and team decisions. 
The experiment was run computerized (using z-Tree; Fischbacher, 1999) with 180 students 
from the University of Innsbruck from various backgrounds. We ran 10 experimental sessions 
à 18 subjects, yielding 180 observations on individual decision-making (90 in stage S1 and 90 
in stage S3) and 30 observations from teams along with concomitant chat-protocols (from 
stage S2). 
 
3. Results 
Table 1 shows the main indicators with respect to the chosen transfers. In stage S1 
individuals send on average 0.94€ to the receiver, i.e. 19% of the endowment.9 The modal 
transfer (of about one third of subjects) is zero. 
The transfers of teams in stage S2 are significantly smaller than those of individuals in 
stage S1 (p < 0.01; Wilcoxon signed ranks test; N = 30). Teams transfer only 0.54€ or about 
11% of their endowment. The maximum transfer is 1.5€ out of 5€, and 12 out of 30 teams 
transfer zero. 
It turns out that the experience of team decision-making even carries over to individual 
decisions in stage S3. The transfers in S3 amount, on average, to 0.66€ (or about 13%) and 
                                                 
8 The instructions specified that in such a case the transfer to the paired team would have been determined 
randomly. 
9 This average is well within the range of transfers (10% to 23%) reported in the survey on experimental dictator 
games by Camerer (2003). 
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are significantly smaller than individual transfers in S1 (p < 0.01; Wilcoxon signed ranks test; 
N = 90), but not significantly different from the team decisions in stage S2 (p > 0.5). These 
results indicate that the experience of team decision-making causes a shift in individually 
preferred allocations in a dictator game. 
 
Table 1. Transfers in the dictator game 
 Stage S1 (N = 90) 
1st individual transfer 
Stage S2 (N = 30) 
Team transfer 
Stage S3 (N = 90) 
2nd individual transfer 
Average transfer T 0.94*,# 0.54* 0.66#
Standard deviation 1.07 0.56 0.85 
Mode = Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Relative frequency of 
Mode = Minimum 34.4% 40.0% 46.7% 
Maximum 5.0 1.5 2.5 
Relative frequency of 
Maximum 1.1% 13.3% 8.9% 
* significantly different at p < 0.01. 
# significantly different at p < 0.01. 
  
 
Figure 1 sheds more light on the influence of team decision-making on subsequent 
individual decisions. It shows for a given subject on the horizontal axis the decision in stage 
S1 and on the vertical axis the decision in stage S3. Observations below the diagonal indicate 
a decrease of transfers from S1 to S3. Individuals are classified according to the relation 
between the team’s decision in stage S2 and the first individual decision in stage S1. Note that 
when the team decision is larger than (see “+” in the figure) or equal to the first individual 
decision in stage S1 (see “○”), then there is no systematic effect of the team decision on the 
subsequent individual decision in stage S3. However, if the team decision is smaller than the 
S1-decision (see “–”) individuals reduce their transfer from S1 to S3 in almost all cases, 
indicated by the  “– “ under the 45-degree line. The latter result implicates a strong influence 
of team decision-making on individual decisions if the team decision is more selfish than the 
initial individual decision, rendering the subsequent individual decision also more selfish. 
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Figure 1. Changes of individual decisions contingent on team decision 
 
Next we examine the process of team decision-making. We have estimated a linear 
model explaining a team’s transfer in S2 as a function of its members’ individual transfers in 
the preceding stage S1.10  
The results are summarized in Table 2. The “most selfish” team member (i.e. the team 
member with the lowest transfer in S1) has by far the largest and in particular the only 
significant impact on the team transfer. The lower the “most selfish“ member’s transfer in S1, 
the lower is the team transfer in S2. This finding is in contrast to the evidence from Cason and 
Mui (1997) who have found that the team transfer is driven by the most other-regarding 
member. 
 
                                                 
10 Using a censored Tobit model yields practically the same results. 
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Table 2. OLS estimates for team transfers 
 
Dependent variable: team transfer 
 
Coefficient 
Robust standard 
errors 
Transfer of “most selfish” member in stage S1 1.037* 0.46 
Transfer of “moderate” member in stage S1 0.131 0.19 
Transfer of “most other-regarding” member in stage S1 -0.094 0.08 
Constant 0.615** 0.20 
Observations 30  
R² 0.08  
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01   
 
In order to gain further insights into the driving forces behind a team’s decision we 
resort to the contents of the chat protocols. On average, teams exchanged 22.3 messages (125 
words) before reaching an agreement.11 However, the variance was rather large, with the 
shortest chat including only five messages with 18 words and the longest one including 58 
messages with 353 words (see Appendix B for a translation of both). In Table 3 we list the 
arguments that have been voiced at least in two separate teams. 
 
Table 3. Main arguments in the electronic team chat 
Argument Number of teams where 
argument is discussed 
Relative frequency of 
teams with argument 
Average transfers
Keep more for ourselves 22 73.3% 0.51 
Fairness and …    
     … smaller transfers  11 36.7% 0.52 
     … higher transfers 6 20.0% 0.70 
Rationality 4 13.3% 0.25 
Economic expertise 2 6.7% 0.00 
 
The argument of sending small transfers in order to “keep more for ourselves” is 
voiced most often, namely in 22 out of 30 teams, and these teams send on average a transfer 
of 0.51€. This argument appeals to group identity by promoting a better outcome for the 
                                                 
11 Neither the number of exchanged messages nor the number of words has any statistically significant impact on 
the team’s transfer in stage S2. 
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members of the team. It is never associated with the blunt claim that the team should behave 
selfishly. 
The notion of “fairness” is mentioned in 17 out of 30 teams. However, it is used in two 
markedly different contexts. There are 11 teams in which remarks on fairness are actually 
used to support less generous transfers, and a typical argument is that “they [the recipients] 
can’t expect us to send a fair share since they wouldn’t do it either” (Team T5). These teams 
send on average 0.52€. In 6 teams the notion of fairness is put forward to induce more 
generous transfers or to prevent relatively small transfers. One example is that “… it’s not fair 
to send only 20 cents, but we should send 1 euro” (Team T18). When fairness is mentioned in 
this context, the average transfer is 0.70€. 
In 4 teams one member mentions that it would be “rational” to send a specific amount, 
without however defining rationality. Two subjects in different teams proposed zero transfers 
and justified their proposal by their “economic expertise”. 
In sum, the arguments put forward seem to support the observation that smaller – 
rather than larger – transfers were the predominant social norm, often supported by arguments 
linked to payoff maximization or rational decision-making, as indicated in Table 3. Under 
these circumstances both PAT as well as SCT would, in fact, predict smaller transfers of 
teams than of individuals, which is what we actually observe. 
Finally, we report in Table 4 data on the influence of gender and gender composition 
on chosen transfers. In stage S2 we distinguish between teams with a female majority (with at 
least two women) and those with a male majority. Please note that it was forbidden to reveal 
one’s gender in the electronic chat of stage S2, which means team members were not aware of 
the other members’ gender. 
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Table 4. Average transfers and gender 
 Stage S1 1st individual transfer 
Stage S2 
Team transfer 
Stage S3 
2nd individual transfer 
Female / female majority 0.78 (N = 38) 0.56 (N = 12) 0.53 (N = 38) 
Male / male majority 1.05 (N = 52) 0.53 (N = 18) 0.75 (N = 52) 
 
 
Within a given stage, we never find any significant difference between decisions taken 
by female or male dictators, respectively by teams with a female or male majority. Our results 
corroborate previous findings of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Bolton and Katok 
(1995). Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) have shown that gender differences in altruism 
depend on the price of other-regarding behavior, and if the price is unity (i.e. the benefits for 
the receiver equal the costs for the dictator), gender differences are not to be expected. Bolton 
und Katok (1995) have observed that those experiments revealing subjects’ gender typically 
find significant gender effects, while studies without such information usually fail to report 
significant effects. The latter observation might account for the insignificant difference 
between male- and female-majority teams, as it was forbidden to reveal one’s gender in our 
electronic chat. In the experiment of Dufwenberg and Muren (2006), however, the gender 
composition of teams was common knowledge, and female-majority teams allocated 
significantly higher amounts to the recipient. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Our experiment has shown that teams choose significantly smaller transfers than 
individuals in a dictator game and that individuals shift their transfers towards the team 
transfer when asked to make a second decision after team interaction. Hence, team decisions 
are more selfish than individual ones. This result is perfectly consistent with the large 
majority of experimental papers that have shown that team decisions are more selfish and 
competitive, less trusting and less altruistic than individual decisions (see, e.g., Bornstein and 
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Yaniv, 1998; Bornstein et al., 2004; Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Cox, 2002; Cox and Hayne, 
2006; Kocher and Sutter, 2005; Kugler et al., 2006). Therefore, we have been able to provide 
a further piece of evidence on the course of completing the emerging mosaic of team 
decision-making in economics. This piece of evidence is in contrast to Cason and Mui’s 
(1997) results, though. 
The differences between our findings and those of Cason and Mui (1997) might be 
explained by differences in the experimental design. First, Cason and Mui (1997) have 
controlled for the order of decision-making by having two treatments, one with the sequence 
“individual-team” decision-making, and another with the reverse order “team-individual”. 
Yet, in both treatments teams are more altruistic than individuals. Therefore, our lack of a 
treatment where subjects start with team decision-making cannot have caused the difference. 
Recall also that individuals were not aware of the subsequent team stage when they decided in 
stage S1. 
Second, Cason and Mui (1997) have used teams with two members whereas we have 
set up teams with three members. So far, there is little systematic variation of the size of 
teams in economic experiments and little evidence regarding its influence on team decisions. 
However, teams have been found to be more strategic and less altruistic both with two 
members (e.g., Cooper and Kagel, 2005), three members (e.g., Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; 
Cox, 2002) or five members (Blinder and Morgan, 2005). Therefore, we are quite confident 
that the different team size is not the cause of the differences between our results and those of 
Cason and Mui (1997). 
Third, and most important, in the experiment of Cason and Mui (1997) “every team 
was called to the front of the room (by identification numbers) and excused to the hallway to 
discuss their decision and fill out the form in private” (p. 1471). This procedure entails two 
important sources for the contrasting evidence. On the one hand, calling team members to the 
front of the room identifies the members of a team. Even though their decisions have 
12 
remained anonymous in the experiment, the mere identification may have caused the higher 
transfers of teams. In fact, the evidence from Frey and Bohnet (1999) shows that transfers in 
the dictator game increase with identification of subjects (without revealing decisions). On the 
other hand, the teams in Cason and Mui’s experiment used face-to-face discussion, whereas in 
our experiment team members interacted only via an electronic chat. Both approaches have 
their merits, but need not be neutral with respect to their influence on final decisions. The 
face-to-face design captures all facets of personal encounters when teams make decisions. 
However, the electronic chat-approach seems more suitable for studying the genuine effects 
of decision-making in teams as it provides a much more controlled environment by preserving 
anonymity and avoiding confounding factors like, for instance, personal sympathy or 
antipathy or prior acquaintance of team members unknown to the experimenter. The 
differences between both approaches might induce different degrees of social distance (within 
and across teams), which could trigger the different results. In fact, Kocher and Sutter (2006) 
have found first mover-teams in a gift-exchange game to act differently, depending upon 
whether team members have to reach a decision via face-to-face communication or via voting 
electronically on different proposals. When using the electronic form of communication, 
teams make more selfish decisions.12 The same mechanism could be the driving force behind 
the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and the current paper, meaning that there is no 
fundamental inconsistency between the two contributions. Obviously, the study of the effects 
of different communication media on team decision-making is an interesting area for future 
research on teams in economics. 
                                                 
12 A somewhat related result can be found in Güth et al. (2006). They show in a large-scale newspaper 
experiment that (individual) decisions in a three-person ultimatum game are more selfish if submitted via 
Internet than via the more personal form of sending a letter. 
13 
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions [not necessarily for publication; 
can be made public on the websites of the authors] 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation! 
Please do not talk to other participants until the end of the experiment! 
 
Instructions 
The aim of this experiment is the investigation of economic decision behavior. During the experiment, you and 
the other participants will be asked to make decisions. You will earn money in doing so. The amount of your 
payoff is determined by your own decisions and by those made by the other participants. 
2 types of participants  
There are two types of participant: type A and type B. You will be randomly assigned to one of these types/roles. 
Duration 
The entire experiment will last for less than 60 minutes and consists of three separate stages that are completely 
independent of each other. 
At the beginning of each stage you will receive detailed instructions for that stage. If you have any questions 
after reading the instructions, please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to you and answer 
your questions privately. 
Payoff 
Your earnings from all three stages will be added up and will be paid to you privately and in cash at the end of 
the experiment. 
Anonymity 
The identities of the participants that have interacted with you will never be revealed to you. The other 
participants will learn neither during nor after the experiment which role you were playing in and how much you 
have earned. 
 
Stage 1 
Each participant of type A is randomly matched with one participant of type B. 
Initial endowment 
Each participant of type A receives 5 EURO as his or her initial endowment. 
Participants of type B do not receive an initial endowment. 
Decision participant A: Choice of a transfer 
Participant A specifies a transfer that determines which part of the initial endowment will be transferred from 
participant A to participant B. Each amount between and including 0 and 5 EURO (in 10 EURO-cent steps) can 
be selected. 
This concludes stage 1 for participant A. You have to confirm your choice by pressing the OK Button. 
Participant B cannot take any action in this stage. 
Results/earnings 
Earnings A = 5 Euro - Transfer 
Earnings B = Transfer 
 
Participant B will be informed of participant A’s decision who he or she is paired with and of the resulting earnings 
only after the end of stage 3. 
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Stage 2 [handed out after completion of stage 1] 
Grouping 
You will be teamed up with two other participants of the same type. The structure of the experiment remains 
exactly the same as in stage 1. Your type remains the same as in the first stage. 
The difference to the first stage is that now the three group members of type A have to agree on one collective 
decision concerning the transfer. 
Each group of type A is randomly matched with one group of type B. Please note that the members of your 
matched group were not matched to you or any other member of your group in the previous stage. 
Your decision in this stage of the experiment does not have any influence on the next stage. 
Initial endowment 
Each member of group A receives 5 EURO as initial endowment. 
The members of group B do not receive an initial endowment. 
Decision group A: Choice of a transfer 
The members of group A have to agree on a transfer. A collective decision means that the three group members 
separately enter one identical number. This amount will be transferred from each member of group A to one 
member of group B. 
Group communication will take place via electronic messaging (chat). Rules for the chat are specified below. 
Group B cannot take any action in this stage. 
Results/earnings  
Earnings of EACH MEMBER of group A = 5 Euro - Transfer 
Earnings of EACH MEMBER of group B = Transfer  
 
Group B will be informed of group A’s decision that they are paired with and of the resulting earnings only after the 
end of stage 3. 
Chat discussion rules 
If you are of type A, you are given the possibility to communicate with the two other members of your group – 
to agree on a transfer – via electronic messaging (chat). The contents of communication is unrestricted, except 
that it is not permitted to reveal personal information like name, age, address, gender (please always use gender-
neutral formulations), field of study (including teachers, classes or contents, which would allow an identification 
of your field of study) or similar statements that lead to your identification (like your seat number in the lab). 
Furthermore, it is forbidden to use offensive language and to arrange side payments (i.e., rewards or 
punishments) of any kind. If you break these communication rules, the experimenters will exclude you from the 
experiment, and you will not receive any payoff for the entire experiment! 
Each group member can send as many messages as he or she wants to the other two group members. Each 
message appears simultaneously on the screens of the other two members of your group. Selective messages to 
individual group members are not possible. As soon as the three group members agree on a transfer, they are 
requested to enter the amount of the transfer on their individual computer screen. Please note that the entries of 
all group members have to be identical in order to be valid. If this is not the case – or if team members have not 
entered a transfer after 10 minutes –earnings from this stage of the experiment will be zero for the group A. The 
transfer to group B would be determined randomly then. 
 
Stage 3 [handed out after completion of stage 2] 
Stage 3 is identical to stage 1. Your task is exactly the same as in stage 1, and you will again make your decision 
individually. If you do not remember the rules from stage 1, please simply take a look at the instructions for 
stage 1 again. Please note that in this stage participants of type A are matched with another participant in 
the role of type B than in stages 1 and 2. 
End 
This experiment ends after the third stage and you will be paid your overall earnings privately and in cash. 
Before being paid, we ask you to fill in a short questionnaire. 
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Appendix B: Two examples of the chat conversation 
The initial number in each line indicates a particular team member  (1 to 3). Italic text at the 
end of a chat refers to the individual decisions in stages S1 and S3. 
 
 
B1. The most extensive discussion 
 
1:Obious decision, don’t you think? 
3: Sure, all for ourselves. 
1: I am no good Samaritan.  
3. Transfer: 0 
3: right, neither am i 
1:we are not responsible for b, are we? 
1: therefore 0 
1: o.k. I’ll enter it. 
3: No. 2, do you share our opinion? 
2: I think we should be fair 
3: I don’t. Nobody has ever been fair to me 
1: 0 is fair 
2: wait a second don’t enter anything 
3: next time you are b and don’t receive nothing 
1: there’s still the show up 
2: that’s a joke 
3: I have also left once only with the show up 
1: me too 
3: I don’t care about the show up….I vote for 0!!! 
2: what’s this penny-pinching about? 
2: we need a compromise 
1: I still don’t understand your point 2 
3: yes, democracy! two against one 
3: please 2, I have been the sucker too often. I am lucky this time and in the position to make some money 
3: transfer=0? 
2: You need those additional 2.5 so desperately? 
3: to be honest: yes 
3:… and I did not get those 2.5 too often 
1: why should we give the money away? 
3: why? 
3: quick now, come on, please enter 0? 
2: I don’t want to play the upholder of moral standards, but I don’t get your point. Compromise: 2 
1: I enter 0 
2: I enter 1.5 
1: you can go on being nice after the experiment 
3: great, we will all get nothing, are you aware of that? 
3: you don’ even know to whom you send the money! 
2: just like b 
2: 1.5 
1: 0 
3: apart from that, I am with No. 1: 2:1 for 0. please accept it No. 2! 
2: hey, 1.5 is obliging 
1: obliging….but completely useless 
3: please2, hurry up and say 0 
2: 1.5 
2. ciao 
3: what are you doing???? 
1: if we do not hurry up, we all will get nothing 
3: 1, what are you doing? 
1: so, what? 
3: 2, what’s the deal, that’s impossible!!!!!!!!!!!! 
2: 1.5 
19 
1: 1? 
2: ok 
3: so, for heavens sake, make that 1! 
 
Individual transfers before team stage / after team stage: 
1: 0/0 
2: 2.5/2.5 
3:2.5/0 
 
 
B2. The shortest discussion 
 
2: I vote for 1 EURO transfer 
1: that’s ok 
3: for me too 
1: that’s a fast decision 
2: great 
 
Individual transfers before team stage / after team stage: 
1: 0.5/0.2 
2: 1/2.5 
3:1.5/0.5 
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